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Regulation Z and the UCCC: The Bewildering 
Maze of Credit Disclosure Provisions 
The last decade has seen dramatic changes in consumer leg- 
islation and regulation, particularly with regard to consumer 
credit. On the federal level, Congress enacted the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act (CCPA) in 1968.' The "Truth in Lending" 
portion of the CCPA is designed to protect consumers through 
uniform disclosure of the actual cost of credit? These disclosure 
requirements are designed to permit a consumer to compare 
credit terms and avoid the uninformed use of   red it.^ The disclo- 
sure provisions of the CCPA are implemented by Regulation Z,4 
which was drafted by the Federal Reserve Board under authority 
granted by the 
On the state level, the most significant developments have 
centered around the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC). 
Originally drafted in 1968, the UCCC is a much more comprehen- 
sive law than the CCPA and was intended to "simplify, clarify, 
and modernize the law" in this area.6 The 1968 UCCC requires 
disclosures that are similar to the CCPA  disclosure^,^ but also 
places limitations on the price of credit8 and prohibits certain 
nefarious creditor practices.' The UCCC was revised in 1974, and 
a much more limited disclosure scheme was adopted.lu 
This Comment will focus on the problems a creditor faces in 
complying with both the federal and state disclosure require- 
ments in states where the UCCC has been adopted. A creditor 
will normally be highly motivated to comply with these laws be- 
cause penalties are relatively severe" and have been rather 
strictly enforced.12 Moreover, most creditors will see the advan- 
1. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§  101-504, 82 Stat. 
146 (codified a t  15 U.S.C. $ 8  1601-16920 (1976), as amended by Act of September 20,1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-109, 59  801-818, 91 Stat. 874). 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976). 
3. Id. 
4. Regulation Z ,  12 C.F.R. § 226 (1978). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). 
6. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 5 1.102-(2)(a) (1968 version) [hereinafter cited 
without cross-reference as U.C.C.C.]. 
7. Compare U.C.C.C. $0 2.301-.313,3.301-.312 (1968 version) with 15 U.S.C. $0 1621- 
1635 (1976). 
8. U.C.C.C. $0 2.201-.210, 3.201-.210 (1968 version). 
9. Id. § $  2.401-.416, 3.401-.409. 
10. Id. §§  3.201-.209 (1974 version). 
11. 15 U.S.C. $ 8  1611, 1640, 1667d (1976); U.C.C.C. $8 5.201-.302 (1968 version). 
12. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Davis 
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tage in serving the public fairly, honestly, and within the bounds 
of the law. The complexity of the disclosure provisions, however, 
makes strict compliance a difficult matter. Considered sepa- 
rately, the technical requirements of the UCCC and the CCPA 
are substantial; together they become a bewildering maze that 
discourages compliance. Extensive changes in the law in the last 
few years tend to compound the confusion. 
To illustrate the difficulties of compliance, this Comment 
will examine the CCPA with its accompanying regulations and 
the 1968 and 1974 drafts of the UCCC. The success of attempts 
to resolve the problems of statutory overlap between the federal 
and state disclosure schemes will then be considered. In conclu- 
sion, a few simple remedial alternatives will be examined. 
A. The CCPA 
The truth-in-lending provisions contained in title I of the 
CCPA13 protect consumers by requiring creditors to disclose all 
costs in a credit transaction in a uniform and meaningful way.14 
Title I of the Act is implemented by Regulation Z,15 which speci- 
fies the detailed disclosures that are outlined only generally in the 
Act itself, and is therefore more important to a creditor than the 
parent legislation. 
The formalities specified by Regulation Z, such as location 
of disclosures, precise order and terminology specifications, and 
type size and style requirements, apply to all substantive disclo- 
sures.16 Timing and substance of the disclosures vary depending 
on whether the transaction involves open end credit,17 closed end 
credit,18 or a consuiner lease.lB In every transaction, however, a 
v. United Cos. Mort. & Inv., Inc., 551 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1977); Grant v. Imperial Motors, 
539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1976); Lauletta v. Valley Buick, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 
1976). 
13. 15 U.S.C. $ 8  1601-1667e (1976). 
Title I also regulates advertising, credit cards, and fair credit billing procedures. 
Other portions of the CCPA include: title 11, Extortionate Credit Transactions; title 111, 
Restrictions on Garnishment; title IV, National Commission on Consumer Finance; title 
V, General Provisions; title VI, Fair Credit Reporting; title VII, Equal Credit Opportunity; 
and title VIII, Fair Debt Collection Practices. See note 1 supra. 
14. See generally 15 U.S.C. $0 1631-1639 (1976). 
15. 12 C.F.R. $ 226 (1978). 
16. Id. $0 226.6(a), .7(c), .8(a), .15(a). 
17. Id. § 226.7. Credit cards are common forms of open end credit arrangements. 
18. Id. $ 226.8. The Regulation refers to "credit other than open end," which means 
normal loans for a fixed dollar amount. 
19. Id. $ 226.15. 
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copy of the disclosure statement must be given to the consumer.20 
The most important substantive disclosures are the finance 
charge and the annual percentage rate. In essence, the finance 
charge is the total of all costs that the consumer must pay for 
credit, either directly or indirectly. It includes interest, loan fee, 
finder's fee, time price differential, amount paid as a discount, 
service charge, points, and credit report fee.21 The annual percen- 
tage rate is the relative cost of credit in percentage terms.22 It is 
computed according to specific mathematical equations and 
technical instructions contained in the Regulation, and it must 
be disclosed with an accuracy of at least one quarter of one per- 
cent? 
Regulation Z also requires disclosure of the repayment proce- 
dure of the credit contract. This includes the number, amounts, 
and due dates or periods of payments scheduled to repay the 
indebtedne~s .~~ The sum of payments must be separately dis- 
closed and identified as "total of payments."25 A payment sched- 
ule including a balloon payment must be explained and clearly 
identified.26 The creditor must explain both the default or delin- 
quency charges that may be assessed because of late payment, as 
well as the method of computing penalty charges that may be 
assessed for early payment? He must also disclose any security 
interest acquired or retained in connection with the extension of 
consumer credit .28 
B. The UCCC 
The UCCC was originally drafted in 1968 by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to provide 
the states with a uniform and comprehensive body of consumer 
credit law.2@ The 1968 UCCC separates "consumer loansf130 from 
"consumer credit salesM31 and prescribes disclosures for each; the 
20. Id. $5 226.7(a), .8(a), .15(a). 
21. Id. $ 226.4(a). 
22. Id. 226.2(g). 
23. Id. 4 226.5. 
24. Id. 4 226.8(b)(3). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 8 226.8(b)(4), (6) .  
28. Id. 4 226.8(b)(5). 
29. U.C.C.C., Prefatory Note at xvii (1974 version). 
30. U.C .C.C. 6 4 3.101-.605 (1968 version). 
31. Id. 4 4  2.101-.605. 
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federal law minimizes this di~t inct ion.~~ 
Other than this major organizational difference, the 1968 
UCCC disclosure requirements vary little from the federal law in 
substance but vary significantly in phraseology. For example, 
while Regulation Z requires disclosure of the "finance charge,""" 
the 1968 UCCC requires disclosure of the "credit service charge" 
in credit sales or the "loan finance charge" in loan  transaction^.^^ 
These disclosures are meant to accomplish the same objective, 
and the charges are calculated the same way.35 Like Regulation 
Z, the 1968 UCCC requires disclosure of the annual percentage 
rate, repayment procedures, balloon payments, delinquency 
charges, penalty charges, and security interests acquired or re- 
tained .36 
The state officer administering the UCCC is charged with the 
enforcement of the law as well as the responsibility to promulgate 
state regulations "not inconsistent with the Federal Consumer 
Credit Protection Because the UCCC definition of the 
CCPA includes Regulation Z,38 the state regulations pursuant to 
the UCCC should parallel the federal regulations quite closely." 
The 1968 version was enacted and prevails with varying de- 
grees of modification in color ad^,^^ Idaho," Indiana," Okla- 
h ~ m a , ~ ~  South C a r ~ l i n a , ~ ~  Utah,45 Wisc~ns in ,~~ and W y ~ m i n g . ~ ~  Of 
these states, South Carolina and Wisconsin adopted a different 
disclosure scheme than the others, which eliminated any overlap 
between state and federal disclosure  requirement^.^" 
In 1974 the UCCC was extensively amended by the National 
32. 12 C.F.R. $ 226.2(p) (1978). See id. § 226.8(c), (d). 
33. Id. 9 226.4. 
34. U.C.C.C. 0 0 2.109, 3.109 (1968 version). 
35. See id. 12 C.F.R. 8 226.4 (1978). 
36. U.C.C.C. 6 0 2.306, 3.306 (1968 version). 
37. Id. § 6.104(2). 
38. Id. 5 1.302. 
39. See Miller, Living with Both the UCCC and Regulation 2, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 4- 
5 (1973). 
40. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-1-101 to -12-105 (1973). 
41. IDAHO CODE $ 8  28-31-101 to -39-108 (Supp. 1978). 
42. IND. CODE ANN. § §  24-4.5-1-101 to -6-203 (Burns 1974). 
43. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14a, $ 8  1-101 to 9-103 (West 1972). 
44. S.C. CODE §§ 37-1-101 to -6-510 (1976). 
45. UTAH CODE ANN, 88 70B-1-101 to -11-105 (Supp. 1977). 
46. WIS. STAT. ANN. § $ 421.101-422.420 (West 1974). 
47. WYO. STAT. §§  40-14-101 to -702 (1977). 
48. The disclosure scheme adopted by these states is more similar to the 1974 UCCC 
than to the 1968 UCCC; it  has eliminated statutory overlap by leaving disclosure regula- 
tion to the federal government. 
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Conference of Commissioners.4v The 1974 UCCC reorganized the 
text of the Code to recognize the obvious similarity between con- 
sumer loans and consumer credit sales, and largely did away with 
the distincton for disclosure purposes.50 Recognizing the problems 
created by duplicative state and federal disclosure provisions, 
and the fact that state regulation had been essentially preempted 
by the federal g ~ v e r n m e n t , ~ ~  the Commissioners eliminated 
nearly all disclosure requirements. Instead, the 1974 draft re- 
quires compliance with the CCPAS2 and adds a few other disclo- 
sure requirements that  go beyond the CCPA.53 Three 
~tates-Iowa,~~ Kansas,55 and MaineS6-have enacted versions of 
the 1974 UCCC. 
The existence of two similar but nonidentical laws requires 
a reconciliation of the overlapping requirements. The 1974 UCCC 
eliminates interaction problems because it leaves disclosure regu- 
lation almost entirely to federal control.57 Six states, however, 
still adhere to the disclosure scheme of the 1968 draft of the 
UCCC and are still faced with the problem of statutory overlap. 
Both federal and state laws have attempted to resolve this prob- 
lem. 
The CCPA preempts state laws only if the state provisions 
are inconsistent with the federal law or regulation, and then only 
to the extent of the incon~istency.~~ This "inconsistency" occurs 
when state law requires different disclosures than Regulation Z 
"with respect to form, content, terminology, or time of delivery," 
or requires disclosure of the finance charge or the annual percen- 
tage rate in any manner other than that prescribed by the federal 
reg~la t ion .~~ A state law is not considered inconsistent "if the 
- 
49. See U.C.C.C., Prefatory Note (1974 version). 
50. Id., Prefatory Note at xxxvi. 
51. Id., Prefatory Note at xxxiii-xxxv. 
52. Id. § 3.201. 
Id. $5 3.202-.209. 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§  537.1101-.7103 (West Supp. 1978). 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§  16a-1-101 to -9-102 (1974). 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, $ 9  1.101-7.127 (Supp. 1978). 
U.C.C.C. $0 3.201-.209 (1974 version). 
15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1976). 
12 C.F.R. 0 226.6(b) (1978). 
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creditor can comply with the State law without violating" the 
regulation .60 
The CCPA allows creditors to supply additional information 
as long as it is not used to mislead or confuse the customer.61 Even 
inconsistent disclosures required by state law may be supplied if 
they are printed on a separate paper, or on the same page if 
printed below and conspicuously separated from the federal dis- 
closures, and if they are clearly identified as inc~nsis tent .~~ 
Although a creditor can handle differences in this way, the 
CCPA provides an alternative. Upon application to the Federal 
Reserve Board, a state may be granted an exemption from the 
federal disclosure provisions for any class of transactions subject 
to state requirements that are "substantially similar" to the fed- 
eral requirements and that make adequate provision for enforce- 
ment? Of course, a creditor cannot obtain this exemption on his 
own and therefore must rely on the state for this alternative. 
On the state level, the 1968 UCCC also attempts to avoid the 
problem of overlapping disclosure provisions. The UCCC seeks to 
"conform the regulation of consumer credit transactions to the 
policies of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection The 
drafters of the UCCC attempted to make the dislosure require- 
ments "substantially similar" to those of the federal law and 
contemplated that adoption of the UCCC would qualify a state 
for exemption from the federal requirements." The provision re- 
quiring state regulations that are similar to Regulation Z6( em- 
powers the state UCCC administrator to update the regulations 
in order to keep them parallel with the federal regulations. Peri- 
odic updating can be more easily accomplished this way than 
through the legislature. By updating the state regulations, an 
exemption, once granted, is expected to continue!' 
In addition, the UCCC disclosure provisions grant the credi- 
tor the option of complying with the UCCC or the CCPAF On 
its face this provision appears to eliminate all possible statutory 
conflict. Nevertheless, as explained in the next section, this pro- 
vision does not provide a reliable alternative to the creditor. 
60. Id. 8 226.6(b)(ii). 
61. Id. 8 226.6(c). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 8 226.12(a), (c)(2). 
64. U.C.C.C. 8 1.102(f) (1968 version). 
65. Id., Prefatory Note at xvii. 
66. Id. 5 6.104(2). 
67. Id., Prefatory Note at xvii-xix. 
68. Id. $8 2.301, 3.301. 
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The attempts to mesh the federal and state provisions have 
resolved the potential conflicts in some states, but not in others. 
Clearly, those states with disclosure schemes similar to the 1974 
UCCC have no interaction problems. Of the six states with sub- 
stantial disclosure requirements based on the 1968 UCCC 
scheme, only Oklahoma and Wyoming have been successful in 
obtaining exemptions from the federal disclosure  requirement^.^^ 
The other states found that the "substantially similar" require- 
ment was treated as a "virtually identical" requirement by the 
Federal Reserve Board.'O Thus, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, and 
Utah have not been granted exemptions from the federal law, 
although all have disclosure provisions based on the 1968 UCCC 
that vary only slightly from the federal requirements. Conse- 
quently, these four states are left with just one avenue in resolving 
the problem of statutory overlap: the UCCC provision allowing a 
creditor to make either the disclosures required by the UCCC or 
those required by the CCPA." Unfortunately, this seemingly 
clear provision is a potential hazard. Professor Fred H. Miller, 
one of the coreporter-draftsmen of the UCCC, points out that a 
creditor cannot disregard the disclosure requirements contained 
in the UCCC because the UCCC requirements go beyond those 
of the CCPA." According to Miller, the conclusion that the 
UCCC provisions allowing compliance with either the UCCC or 
the CCPA permit a total disregard for the UCCC disclosures 
would be "unadulterated nonsense" since it would mean "that 
the drafters of the UCCC were merely expending ink and paper" 
in adding those provisions of the UCCC not contained in Regula- 
tion Z.73 For example, the UCCC provision requiring disclosure of 
closing costs in a real estate transaction" has no comparable 
counterpart in Regulation Z. To allow a creditor to disregard this 
provision by choosing to comply only with the CCPA would vio- 
late a fundamental rule of statutory construction that requires a 
court to give reasonable effect to every provision of a statute and 
69. See Supplement 111 to Regulation Z, 35 Fed.'Reg. 5215 (1970), as amended by 35 
Fed. Reg. 7550, 10,358, 11,992 (1970), 37 Fed. Reg. 24,105 (1972), 43 Fed. Reg. 49,973 
-- - (1978). 
70. U.C.C.C., Prefatory Note at xxxiii (1974 version). 
71. Id. $$ 2.301, 3.301 (1968 version). 
72. Miller, supra note 39, at 7-8. 
73. Id. at 8-9. 
74. U.C.C.C. $8 2.202(3), 2.306(2)(h), 3.202(3), 3.306(2)(e) (1968 version). 
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to interpret the entire statute so that "no part will be inoperative 
or superfluous. "75 
Although it is not certain whether a court would permit a 
total disregard of the UCCC disclosure provisions, it is possible 
to construe the provision allowing election between the state and 
federal statutes as allowing a creditor to ignore only the UCCC 
requirements that duplicate those of the CCPA. This constructon 
renders the provision operative, and also gives effect to the UCCC 
disclosure provisions not contained in the CCPA. 
The problem of unresolved conflicts would not exist if the 
disclosure requirements were identical, or if one law were com- 
pletely subsumed by the other. Obviously, however, this is not 
the case. Another example helps to point out the complexity of 
the problem. Regulation Z requires the creditor in a consumer 
credit sale to disclose the "cash price" of the property or service 
purchased, the amount of any "cash downpayment," the value of 
any "trade-in," the sum of these or "total downpayment," and 
several other specific  disclosure^.^^ The UCCC also requires these 
disclosures, but adds two more: (1) a brief description or identifi- 
cation of the goods, services, or interests in land and (2) the 
amount agreed to be paid, if in connection with the downpayment 
the seller has agreed to discharge a security interest in the prop- 
erty traded. This amount must also be deducted from the "trade- 
in. "77 Admittedly, these added disclosures are insubstantial, but 
it is the very insubstantiality of the variations that makes the 
added complexity so fruitless. This type of variation makes it 
necessary to comb the disclosure provisions of both the UCCC 
and Regulation Z, compile a list containing each of their ele- 
ments, and determine which requirements must be met for a 
particular transaction. The technical nature of these provisions 
makes such a task both tedious and confu~ing.~~ 
Thus, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, and Utah are faced with a 
75. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973). See 
H. BLACK, HANDBOOK N THE CONSTRUC-MON AND IFJTERPRETATION F THE LAWS § 47 (2d ed. 
1911). 
Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, and Utah-the four states where this issue is most criti- 
cal-have all adopted the rule which requires a court to give effect to every provision of a 
statute. E.g., Bedford v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 102 Colo. 538, 543, 81 P.2d 752, 754 
(1938); Wright v. Village of Wilder, 63 Idaho 122, 125, 117 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1941); Dowd 
v. Johnston, 221 Ind. 398, 401, 47 N.E.2d 976, 977 (1943); In re Yonk's Estate, 115 Utah 
292, 301, 204 P.2d 452, 457 (1949). 
76. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(c) (1978). 
77. U.C.C.C. § 2.306(2)(a), (c) (1968 version). 
78. See Butler, Truth and Confusion in Lending, 55 A.B.A.J. 27, 28 (1969). 
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situation that is needlessly confusing: overlapping but variant 
state and federal disclosure provisions, an unreliable option to 
disregard the state law, and no exemption granted from the fed- 
eral law. Of these four states, only Utah has adopted a state 
regulation pursuant to the UCCC that is patterned after Regula- 
tion Z7@ Because the regulation is patterned after the 1969 version 
of Regulation Z and has not been amended since its adoption, a 
Utah creditor is faced with not just two, but rather three different 
sets of requirements: the UCCC, the 1979 Regulation Z, and a 
state regulation almost identical to the 1969 Regulation 2. 
Adding to the bewilderment of an already confused creditor, 
the variations in the technical disclosure provisions are com- 
pounded by the variations in the scope and coverage of state and 
federal laws. The key to understanding the scope of the consumer 
credit laws is to examine the various transactions to which each 
relates? With only a few  exception^,^^ the UCCC and Regulation 
Z disclosure requirements apply to consumer leasesa2 and con- 
sumer credit  transaction^.^^ Regulation Z applies to all consumer 
leases and consumer credit transactions up to $25,000, and to 
consumer credit transactons over $25,000 that are secured partly 
by an interest in real estate? The UCCC, however, provides for 
automatic biannual adjustment of dollar amounts in accordance 
79. 5 Utah Admin. Rules A68-01-cccl to -cccll (1969). 
80. See Miller, supra note 39. 
81. See U.C.C.C. 06 2.601-.605, 3.601-.605 (1968 version). 
82. The UCCC and Regulation Z definitions of a consumer lease include the following 
common characteristics: 
(1) the lessor is regularly engaged in the business of making leases; 
(2) the lessee is a natural person, not an organizaton; 
(3) the lease is made primarily for a personal, family, household, or agricul- 
tural purpose; 
(4) the lease is for a term of at least four months; and 
(5) the amount of the lease does not exceed a certain dollar amount. 
Id. 4 2.106; 12 C.F.R. 5 226.2(mm) (1978). 
83. The UCCC and Regulation Z definitions of consumer credit transaction include 
the following common characteristics: 
(1) the creditor is regularly engaged in the business of extending or arrang- 
ing consumer credit; 
(2) the debtor is a natural person, not an organization; 
(3) the debt is incurred primarily for personal, family, household, or agricul- 
tural purposes; 
(4) either the debt is payable in installments or a finance charge is made; 
and 
(5) either the amount of credit extended does not exceed a certain dollar 
amount or the debt is secured by an interest in land. 
U.C.C.C. §§ 2.104, 3.104 (1968 version); 12 C.F.R. OP 226.2(p), (s), .3(c) (1978). 
84. See 12 C.F.R. $ 0  226.2(p), .3(c), (e) (1978). 
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with changes in the consumer price index," so its applicable 
upper dollar limits are different than under the federal law and 
subject to biannual change. For example, in Utah and Idaho the 
UCCC applies to all consumer leases and credit'transactions up 
to $45,000 as of July 1978? In Indiana, the UCCC applies to 
leases and transactions up to $37,500 as of July 1978? 
To confuse matters further, the federal and state laws ex- 
empt different types of transactions from reg~ la t ion .~~  Because of 
variations in the exemptions, some types of transactions are sub- 
ject to both the UCCC and Regulation Z, others are exempt from 
both, and still others are subject to only one or the other. For 
example, governmental credit is exempted from both laws,s9 while 
transactions involving licensed pawnbrokers are exempt from the 
UCCC but not Regulation Z.'O Agricultural transactions over 
$25,000 are exempt from Regulation Z whether or not they involve 
a security interest in real pr~perty ,~ '  but are not exempt from the 
UCCC unless they involve more than the applicable upper dollar 
limits of the particular state.g2 
The complexity of the differences in coverage is further ex- 
emplified by the situation in Utah. Currently, a creditor must 
comply with both the UCCC and Regulation Z in any nonexempt 
consumer transaction up to $25,000.93 Both laws also apply to 
transactions secured by land involving amounts up to $45,000.94 
In agricultural transactions and non-real property transactions 
involving amounts between $25,000 and $45,000, only the UCCC 
applies, g5 and in consumer credit transactions involving more 
85. U.C.C.C. § 1.106 (1968 version). 
86. See 2 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) Idaho 7 6503 (1978); 4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 
Utah 7 6521 (1978). 
87. 2 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) Indiana 7 6531 (1978). 
The Colorado legislature refused to enact the biannual adjustment provision. Thus, 
the Colorado UCCC applies to all consumer lease and consumer credit transactions that 
do not exceed $25,000. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-2-104, -106, -3-104 (1973). 
88. See U.C.C.C. § 1.202 (1968 version); 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 (1978); Miller, The Basic 
Exclusions from the UCCC: A Roadmap for Traversing a New World with Oblique Guides, 
43 U .  COLO. L. REV. 269 (1972). 
89. U.C.C.C. $ 1.202(1) (1968 version); 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(a) (1978). 
90. U.C.C.C. 8 1.202(4) (1968 version). See 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 (1978). 
91. 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(e) (1978). 
92. U.C.C.C. $6 2.104, 3.104 (1968 version). 
93. UTAH CODE ANN. Ki 70B-2-104, -3-104 (Supp. 1977); 12 C.F.R. $ 9  226.2(p), .3 
(1978). 
94. See UTAH CODE ANN. § $ 70B-1-202, -2-104, -3-104 (Supp. 1977); 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 
(1978); 4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) Utah f( 6521 (1978). 
95. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-1-202, -2-104, -3-104 (Supp. 1977); 12 C.F.R. 6 226.3 
(1978); 4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) Utah f( 6521 (1978). 
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than $45,000 that are secured by an interest in real property, only 
Regulation Z applies. O6 
The irony of the confusion caused by overlapping disclosure 
schemes is twofold. First, it is anomalous that the UCCC, which 
was drafted to "simplify, clarify, and modernize the law,"Y7 
should produce complex and obscure compliance pr~blems.~"ec- 
ond, since both laws require disclosures to be made "clearly and 
conspicuously,"@@ it is unfortunate that the overlapping require- 
ments should result in confusion that is counterproductive to 
producing clear disclosures. 
IV. REMEDIAL ALTERNATIVES 
In the four states still hampered by conflicting disclosure 
schemes, simple legislative surgery on the state level could easily 
resolve the problem. The states could, for example, rescind the 
entire UCCC. Although this would undeniably solve the problems 
of statutory overlap, it would result in an unfortunate abandon- 
ment of the worthwhile UCCC provisions unrelated to disclosure. 
A repeal of only that portion of the UCCC related to disclo- 
sure would leave only the federal disclosure regulations.1oo This 
may, however, require the states to give up some important dis- 
closures not included in Regulation Z. And although a repeal of 
the state disclosure requirements would promote administrative 
and judicial economy, it would also deprive the state of local 
enforcement power. States desiring to maintain local power to 
enforce the disclosure laws could simply repeal the present disclo- 
sure provisions and draft a single provision requiring compliance 
with the CCPA and regulations drafted pursuant to the Act.'"' 
If the legislature decided that as a matter of state policy 
disclosures should be required in addition to Regulation 2, an 
amendment adopting the 1974 UCCC disclosure scheme would 
96. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§  70B-1-202, -2-104, -3-104 ($uPP. 1977); 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 
(1978); 4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) Utah 7 6521 (1978). 
97. U.C.C.C. 6 1.102(2)(a) (1968 version). 
98. "Creditors have found that any additional provisions of state law on the subject 
constitute nothing more than an additional nuisance in attempts to comply with the law 
and frequently only add confusion in these efforts to comply." Miller & Warren, A Report 
on the Revision of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 22 (1974). 
99. U.C.C.C. § 3.302(1) (1968 version); 12 C.F.R. $ 226.6(a) (1978). 
100. See Harper, The Uniform Comumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 53, 60-61 (1969). 
101. This was the effect of the 1974 revision of the UCCC. See Miller & Warren, 1974 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 KAN. L. REV. 619, 637-38 (1975). For an example of 
such a provision, see U.C.C.C. 6 3.201 (1974 version). 
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probably include most of the significant disclosures not included 
in Regulation Z. This simple alternative would encourage uni- 
formity in the various state laws.lo2 Even if a state should decide 
that the 1974 UCCC is unacceptable, the approach used by the 
Commissioners in drafting the 1974 version, which might be de- 
scribed as "Regulation Z plus specified additional disclosures," 
seems far more sensible than the scheme currently in force. This 
approach would allow creditors to refer to one comprehensive 
document-Regulation Z-for the main requirements, and a sim- 
ple supplement-the UCCC-for minor additional disclosure re- 
quirements. 
Although these alternatives would resolve the conflicts in the 
content of the disclosure requirements, the transactional scope of 
the requirements is still a problem. The states could easily step 
aside and let the federal regulations control by stating in the few 
disclosure provisions retained by the state that the provisions 
apply only to those transactions specified in the CCPA and its 
accompanying regulations. Since this question may be of major 
concern to local consumer and creditor groups, however, state 
policy may warrant a regulation with a scope broader than that 
of Regulation Z.lo3 In this case, an approach regulating transac- 
tions covered by Regulation Z plus specified additional transac- 
tions would seem wise. For example, a state could require disclo- 
sures in non-real property transactions in which the amount fi- 
nanced is not in excess of $45,000, thus extending the scope of the 
transactions regulated. Using this approach, the state's disclosure 
provisions could still apply to the same dollar amounts as a t  
present, but much of the confusion inherent in the current laws 
would be eliminated. 
Of the eleven states that have enacted the UCCC to date, a t  
least four have encountered serious problems in meshing the state 
disclosure requirements with the federal regulations. These prob- 
lems add confusion and uncertainty to the creditor's already diffi- 
cult task of compliance. They create a potential source of litiga- 
-- 
102. For a discussion of the advantage of uniform laws, see Felsenfeld, Uniform, 
Uniformed, and Unitary Laws Regulating Consumer Credit, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 209,221- 
31 (1968). 
103. Narrower regulation would, of course, be meaningless because the federal law 
would always require the disclosures to be made in the transactions it applies to, no matter 
which transactions the state decides to regulate. 
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tion and undue liability for the creditor.lo4 Since the cost of credi- 
tor compliance is presumably a component in the price a con- 
sumer pays for credit, the cost of consumer credit is likely to 
increase as the cost of compliance increases. Simple remedies to 
the perplexing problems of compliance are available and should 
be promptly implemented. 
Robert S. Clark 
104. In 1973 Senator John Tower of Texas recognized that conflicting state disclosure 
requirements could be a problem and proposed an amendment to the CCPA that would 
exempt a creditor from liability under a state law which was ambigous in light of federal 
law. S. REP. NO. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1973). 
